The meta problem of consciousness. David Chalmers’ framing of the meta-problem of consciousness revolves around the fact that the hard problem of consciousness resonates with so many people, and possible explanations for why this is so. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various featuresthatgiverisetothe hardproblem. A solution to the meta-problem could shed The meta problem of consciousness asks why there seems to be a hard problem of consciousness. In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem" (Chalmers, 2018, p. Among them is the ignorance hypothesis -- the view that there only appears to be a hard problem because of our inadequate conception of the physical. Fail to identify a conscious AI, and you might Oct 16, 2023 · AI consciousness isn’t just a devilishly tricky intellectual puzzle; it’s a morally weighty problem with potentially dire consequences. Aug 11, 2023 · Abstract. 1 The commentaries divide fairly nearly into about three groups. Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61 (2018) Two Problems for Non-Inferentialist Views of the Meta-Problem. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. Jun 18, 2004 · Consciousness of the meta-mental sort may well involve not only an increase in self-awareness but also an enhanced understanding of the mental states of other minded creatures, especially those of other members of one's social group (Humphreys 1982). Equipped with this distinction, the scientists can narrow the focus of research either into the mechanisms producing phenomenal character or into the processes The Meta-Problem is The Problem of Consciousness. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips The hard problem of consciousness is about how we could explain in physicalist terms why we are conscious. The Hard Problem Isn’t Getting any Easier: Thoughts on Chalmers’ “Meta-Problem”. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why there seems to be a hard problem of consciousness. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. Whether consciousness is hard to explain depends on the notion of explanation at play. Abstract Chalmers (2018) considers a wide range of possible responses to the meta-problem of consciousness. In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. Chalmers(Journal ofConsciousnessStudies 25:6–61, 2018, 8) suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant Mar 29, 2022 · The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining these reports. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):200-19, 1995. Feb 12, 2019 · In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem" (Chalmers, 2018, p. For example, I know of a patient who had a successful career in accountancy, despite severe psychotic delusions. Here I present what I think is the best approach to answer the meta-problem: the evidential approach. Apr 18, 2016 · David Chalmers is Professor of Philosophy and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at New York University, and also holds a part-time position at the Australian National University. It examines David Chalmers pro phenomenological formulation and Kieth Frankish's illusionist formulation. By contrast, the hard problem and the Appearance, Reality, and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires, among other things, explaining why we are so reluctant to endorse various forms of illusionism about the phenomenal. (though I do ofcourse think consciousness is best explained by souls, but I’m not going to talk about that in this paper) The meta-problem is the challenge of explaining why we think this 'hard problem' exists. Philosopher David Chalmers elucidated the hard problem of consciousness in 1995. By contrast, the hard problem and the The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. Feb 13, 2023 · The meta-problem of consciousness . Having identified these, neuroscientists must fix those shortcomings. About a quarter of them discuss the question of whether intuitions about The answer would involve heavy-duty metaphysical theorizing, probably including a commitment either to substance dualism or to the existence of a mysterious intrinsic subjectivity. core of what Chalmers calls the meta-problem of consciousness. To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal Jan 21, 2022 · Now, we can approach the question: why are people so convinced that they have an ineffable, subjective feel that accompanies their thinking and their perception? Why are people so convinced that they have consciousness? Chalmers has called this question the ‘meta-problem’ of consciousness (Chalmers 2018). Neglecting the “meta-problem” can not only obscure the “hard Two Problems for Non-Inferentialist Views of the Meta-Problem. I will try to tackle this task in two steps. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence. The hard problem of consciousness is a bit of a controversial subject. : Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function (Talks@Fermilab, March 2020; also two 2021 versions) The Nature and Ethics of Consciousness (5-hour audio interview with 80,000 hours, October 2019) The answer would involve heavy-duty metaphysical theorizing, probably including a commitment either to substance dualism or to the existence of a mysterious intrinsic subjectivity. The hard problem typic François Kammerer The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. We are also materialists and naturalists (Barron and Klein, 2016), unlike Chalmers. Dec 17, 2019 · The dual theory divides the problem of consciousness into the problem of explaining how the phenomenal character of a mental state is formed, and the problem of consciousness as such. Jun 30, 2023 · Famously, he called consciousness “the hard problem,” which he believed was sufficiently challenging to keep any explanation of consciousness at bay for at least a quarter of a century. According to Chalmers (2018), the meta-problem of consciousness is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness'. I propose a theory to solve the illusion problem. Chalmers sees between the hard problem and the meta-problem: ‘Whatever explains consciousness (the hard problem) should also play a central role in explaining our judgments about consciousness (the meta-problem)’ (p. A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In some cases, in the early stages, there is no problem with behaviour, but only with subjective experience. Recent attempts to move this debate forward by shifting them to a meta-level have heavily relied on the notion of “intuition”, understood in a NOTE: I am not saying that consciousness itself disproves atheism/materialism. Chalmers (2018) considers a wide range of possible responses to the meta-problem of consciousness. The most promising solutions to the meta-problem reviewed by Chalmers In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. Sep 21, 2018 · The meta-problem of consciousness is in principle one of the easy problems, but it bears a special relation to the hard problem, which suggests that finding a solution to it could shed light on the hard problem itself. Chalmers (Journal of Consciousness Studies 25: 6–61, 2018, 8) suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant light on the hard problem. Graham Peebles - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):156-165. One possibility is that the challenge arises from ontology—because consciousness is a special property/substance that is irreducible to the physical. Logically, the answer is that the Feb 15, 2019 · The meta-problem of consciousness is in principle one of the easy problems, but it bears a special relation to the hard problem, which suggests that finding a solution to it could shed light on the hard problem itself. In his paper, titled 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness', published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great service to the field of consciousness studies by laying down a cesses give rise to consciousness. Therefore, the theory of the universe is a theory of consciousness. At stake is how the physical body gives rise to subjective experience. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining these reports. inferentialist view of the meta-problem, on which the hard problem results from inference, explains both the psychology and content introduction. This argument does not require me to argue that. Giovanni Merlo - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):120-130. . I argue that on the basis of three hypotheses about the mind—which I call introspective Apr 30, 2020 · The meta-problem of consciousness aims to explain the particularity of our intuitions about consciousness and how they trigger conceptual issues such as the hard problem of consciousness. Two Caveats to the Meta The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. A far less extravagant option is to endorse the illusionist response and conclude that the meta-problem is not a meta-problem at all but the problem of consciousness. Oct 16, 2023 · AI consciousness isn’t just a devilishly tricky intellectual puzzle; it’s a morally weighty problem with potentially dire consequences. Equivalently, it is the problem of explain-ing why people have problem intuitions: dispositions to make certain key judgments that underlie the problem of consciousness. The problem of consciousness and introspection. Solutions to the meta-problem and their limit In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers presents the meta-problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. Solutions to the meta-problem and their limit In "The Meta-Problem of Consciousness", David Chalmers presents the meta-problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how physical systems give rise to subjective experience. Keith Frankish - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):83-94. Namely, there is no way, even in principle, to reduce the qualities of conscious experience to physical entities, which are purely quantitative. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. Added to PP 2019-09-25 experience the higher or deeper states of consciousness postulated by these systems. 1 Your first section uses far too many words to say, "let's assume consciousness is a thing"--an assumption that most would agree with. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various features that give rise to the hard problem. If our ordinary concepts of consciousness were functional concepts, then there would be no hard problem of consciousness, or at least the problem would be much easier to dismiss. Jan 21, 2022 · The scientific question of consciousness then becomes: what is the real mechanism that gives rise to the self-model on which our belief in a hard problem of consciousness depends? AST is a specific theory that addresses that question. The meta-problem of consciousness is framed as a route into investigating why there are problems in understanding consciousness by describing the mechanisms underpinning our tendency to describe consciousness as problematic, and the evolutionary origins of these mechanisms. This paper argues that the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in this context has a technical meaning Jan 1, 2019 · Request PDF | On Jan 1, 2019, Hakwan Lau and others published A socio-historical take on the meta-problem of consciousness | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate Mar 14, 2022 · Friston is an eliminativist trying to provide a topic neutral explanation to the hard problem of consciousness and not to the meta-problem like Clark; however, what is interesting here from a modeling point is that Lisman (2005) and Lisman and Buzsáki (2008) “theta precession inspired” Temporal Coding mechanism seems to provide such Abstract Following Chalmers, I take the most promising response to the meta-problem to be a realizationist one on which (roughly) consciousness plays a role in realizing the processes that explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. Apr 6, 2019 · The meta-problem of consciousness is a fulcrum concept. This is the paper where I introduced the “hard problem” of consciousness. The Meta-Problem, Introspection, and Inference The meta-problem of consciousness is to explain the origin of the hard problem I don't think you understand the meta-problem of consciousness, which has to do with why people are even inclined to talk about the seeming problems of consciousness in the first place. consciousness may refer to psychological states (cognition or functions); on the other hand, consciousness may refer to phenomenal experience (see Chalmers, 1996, pp. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach pp. I believe that their accumulated psychological material could help explain many aspects of the problem of consciousness and the meta-problem, if approached from the right angle and with an adequate explanatory framework. And criticisms of it seem to me as if they are missing the point. It is common to characterise phenomenal consciousness as what it is like to be in a mental state. The meta-problem of consciousness is about how we could explain why we have a hard problem of consciousness. Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. 6). At the same time, a solution will almost certainly have consequences for the hard problem of consciousness. Dec 25, 2019 · This essay is about how to think of the meta problem of consciousenss. The meta-problem of consciousness, as David Chalmers defines it, is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. net In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. intuitions Sep 6, 2016 · The problem of explaining how or why neurophysiological processing gives rise to phenomenal experiences has been dubbed the “hard problem of consciousness” to suggest that solving it requires a paradigm shift in neuroscience (Chalmers, 1995, 1996). I propose in this article that these stem from a basic function of the brain : self-evidencing explanation. Consciousness presents a “hard problem” to scholars. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. This paper was funded by Australian Research Council Grant FT140100422 (to CK) and FT140100452 (to ABB). About half of them discuss potential solutions to the meta-problem. We suggest that the core of the meta-problem is the seeming 10 arbitrariness of subjective experience. Chalmers introduces the 9 problem intuitions by appeal to the verbal reports that ordinary people 10 make about consciousness. See full list on consc. The hard problem typically contrasts The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy pp. Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):131-142. We should therefore prefer an inferentialist view of the meta-problem. Apr 14, 2022 · David Chalmers The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how physical systems give rise to subjective experience. ” Against this, I In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. The meta-problem is strictly speaking an easy problem, and solving it is a tractable empirical project for cognitive scientists. Why consciousness is “hard”, however, is uncertain. The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. This response to the target paper endorses illusionist accounts of three 'problem intuitions' about consciousness: duality, presentation, and revelation. 1. Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. It The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. 11-31 for a detailed discussion of this distinction). It underlies both the hard problem of consciousness and the hard problem of causality. e. The meta-problem of consciousness is literally the discrete, binary system of rationality. In this note I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy can in principle provide a satisfactory solution to the meta-problem. The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. Here, I show how the “hard problem” emerges The Meta-Problem of Consciousness; Recent events, videos, etc. In his "second approximation", he says it is the problem of explaining the behavior of " phenomenal reports", and the behavior of expressing a belief that there is a hard problem of consciousness. The thesis that these concepts are not functional concepts is crucial to solving the meta-problem. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i. 124-135(12) Author: Kammerer, F. I distinguish between the easy problems and the hard problem, and I argue that the hard problem eludes conventional methods of explanation. In his paper, titled ‘The Meta-Problem of Consciousness’, published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great service to the field of consciousness studies by laying down… Abstract The intuition that consciousness is hard to explain may fade away as empirically adequate theories of consciousness develop. Abstract I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. In this paper I argue that the key to understanding both consciousness itself and addressing the meta-problem is to understand what acquaintance is and what its objects are. Chalmers’ new paper introduces the meta-problem, lays out an interdisciplinary research program for addressing the meta The Meta-Problem of Consciousness is the problem of understanding the universe, reality and consciousness as part of the universe. Some philosophers and scientists agree that there is a hard problem and others don’t. We are realists about consciousness, like Chalmers. 36). Fail to identify a conscious AI, and you might In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers presents the meta-problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. 7 Chalmers’ (2018) meta-problem of consciousness emphasizes unexpected common ground 8 between otherwise incompatible positions. AST relates consciousness to attention (Graziano and Kastner 2011; Graziano 2013; Webb and Graziano 2015). Chalmers' new paper introduces the meta-problem, lays out an interdisciplinary research program for addressing the meta-problem Jan 1, 2021 · In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem" (Chalmers, 2018, p. 62-73(12) Author: Diaz-Leon, E. Analytics. We argue that the materialist should welcome 9 discussion of the meta-problem. May 28, 2021 · The history of science includes numerous challenging problems, including the “hard problem” of consciousness: Why does an assembly of neurons—no matter how complex, such as the human brain—give rise to perceptions and feelings that are consciously experienced, such as the sweetness of chocolate or the tenderness of a loving caress on one's cheek? 6 tion for why people find consciousness so puzzling? 7 Perhaps I am being too quick to equate the ‘problem intuitions’ with 8 the hard problem and the explanatory gap. the explanans). The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. I learned a great deal from reading them and from thinking about how to reply. This argument is instead about what some call the “Meta Problem” of consciousness. The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. We review socio-historical factors that account for why, as a field, the neuroscience of consciousness has not been particularly successful at getting May 22, 2020 · Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. For Chalmers, "the easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly Apr 3, 2024 · The conclusion that consciousness intuitions are constructed psychologically further underscores the intimate link between the “hard problem” and the problem of explicating the psychological mechanisms that give rise to intuitions (the “meta-problem” (Chalmers 2018)). Add to favourites Favourites: ADD. But I think the opposite is also interesting: Why are there people who completely reject that there is any problem? To me, for example, the explanatory gap is clear. Chalmers describes illusionism (Frankish, 2016) as the view that ‘consciousness is or involves a sort of introspective 6 tion for why people find consciousness so puzzling? 7 Perhaps I am being too quick to equate the ‘problem intuitions’ with 8 the hard problem and the explanatory gap. I am grateful to the authors of the 39 commentaries on my article “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. Importantly, for an explanation to be successful, it is necessary to have a correct understanding of the relevant basic empirical facts (i. At a first pass, we think that the meta-problem arises due to limited access to complex brain states, along with a false belief that Apr 20, 2016 · Several brain regions and physiological processes have been proposed to constitute the neural correlates of consciousness. The meta-problem of consciousness is to explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a [hard] problem of consciousness. The illusion problem (Frankish 2016) is to explain the cause of the illusion, or why we are powerfully disposed to judge—erroneously—that we are phenomenally conscious. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a metatheory is a theory about theo-ries, the metaproblem is a problem about a problem. The hard problems are those that seem to resist those methods. Jun 24, 2020 · The hard problem of consciousness has two roots: an outdated philosophy of science, and a deep (but not insuperable) limitation in our own ability to understand the roots of our experiences. Feb 27, 2021 · The discussion of the nature of consciousness seems to have stalled, with the “hard problem of consciousness” in its center, well-defined camps of realists and eliminativists at two opposing poles, and little to none room for agreement between. The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the prob-lem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain. Aug 11, 2022 · The goal of the theory is to show that consciousness is a physical phenomenon and that there is a physical solution for the hard problem of consciousness. The universe is what we know about the universe. David Chalmers. We review socio-historical factors that account for why, as a field, the neuroscience of consciousness has not been particularly successful at developing empirically adequate theories. It is literally a “tipping point”; and as an abstraction in itself, it cannot be overstated. In this Review, Koch and colleagues discuss studies that distinguish the The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. Mar 7, 2023 · However, the symptoms of schizophrenia seem to arise largely from problems occurring with conscious processes. He is well-known for his work in the philosophy of mind, especially for his formulation of the “hard problem” of consciousness. On Chalmers' view of the meta-problem, our judgments about Nov 25, 2021 · Recent developments and challenges in consciousness research refer to meta-awareness, which can also be termed “metacognitive awareness” or “reflective awareness,” meant as the metacognitive function of being reflectively aware of the processes, contents and states of consciousness, including the processes and contents of conscious Jan 7, 2022 · PDF | On Jan 7, 2022, Michael Prost published The Meta-Problem of Philosophy and the Solution to the Hard Problem and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness | Find, read and cite all the research you Apr 1, 2021 · According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. wfxslrfyjufmuiwofvmvruhlsaxcghgjxpfizvjdryv